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DISTRIBUTION IN ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE: IS THERE A MIDDLE GROUND?
RICHARD J. LAZARUS*
At the outset, I must abandon "the Center." It is very hard to
hold on to the Center when you have Dr. Greve on the panel be-
cause he pushes things so far over that the Center ends up being
pretty far to the Left. To try, nonetheless, to bring things back to
the Center, what I would like to do is take up the question that
Professor Gregory raised in the first instance, and that is the chal-
lenge of the very title of this panel-"Racism or Economics"-
which presents a false dichotomy.
It is a misguided and false dichotomy at three different levels.
The factors, racism and economics, are not mutually preclusive;
they are not unrelated; and the dichotomy misapprehends what
environmental justice is all about.'
First, the factors are not mutually preclusive. Why not both?
Why not sometimes racism, sometimes economics, and sometimes
both? Why does not the possibility of "both" mean the problem
may be twice as large, rather than half as large, as one might
think. Why one and not the other? I do not doubt that there are
instances when it is more racism than economics, and that there
are instances when it is more economics than racism. But I would
like to see somebody defend the thesis that it is just economics.
What would make environmental protection so special that it
* Professor of Law, Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri; former Assistant to the
Solicitor General, U.S. Department of Justice. Professor Lazarus has represented the
United States, state and local governments, and environmental groups before the United
States Supreme Court in approximately thirty cases. In addition, he has written numerous
law review articles relating to environmental and natural resources law.
This contribution to the symposium is a slightly edited version of oral remarks presented
by Professor Lazarus at St. John's University, School of Law. It seeks to retain the flavor of
that presentation. The footnotes were subsequently added by the editors of the St. John's
Journal of Legal Commentary.
1 See Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing "Environmental Justice": The Distributional Effects
of Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 787, 825 (1993). "The pursuit of 'environ-
mental justice' within the context of environmental law is necessarily problematic because
to define the issue exclusively in those terms misapprehends the nature of the problem in
the first instance. The distributional inequities that appear to exist in environmental pro-
tection are undoubtedly the product of broader social forces." Id.
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would somehow be immune from the kinds of racist attitudes
ranging from the most venal to the most subconscious stereotypi-
cal decisionmaking that we know otherwise influence decision-
making on a day to day basis?2
Why should we suppose that environmental protection law
policymakers are somehow unencumbered by those same kinds of
attitudes? We know that such attitudes affect who is hired, who is
fired in the employment sector. We know they affect where one
attends school. We know they affect the level of health care that is
obtained. We know that they affect the price that one pays for a
car. We know that they affect the interest rate one gets for a loan.
We know that they affect the extent to which one is arrested, con-
victed, and the sentence that one receives, including, many be-
lieve, the death sentence. We know these attitudes affect who one
dates, who one marries. (I have yet to see an interracial couple on
the Love Connection).3
What is so special about environmental pollution and law? Why
would environmental pollution and environmental protection be
somehow immune from all these attitudes?4 Why would the distri-
bution, the benefits, and burdens associated with it, unlike all
these other well-established areas, not suffer from these same
well-established tendencies?5 I doubt it. And I think that the re-
cent studies that suggest there is an economic dimension to who is
subject to pollution and who benefits from cleanup do not question
that there is simultaneously a racial dimension.
Second, race and economics is a false dichotomy because the two
are clearly interrelated. Racism and economics are not independ-
ent variables. They are dependent variables. Economics is unre-
lated to race no more than politics is unrelated to race, which is
another false dichotomy I have seen in this area.
2 See Thomas A. Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1060,
1066-69 (1991); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 322-23 (1987).
3 See Aleinikoff, supra note 2, at 1067.
4 See Derrick A. Bell Jr., After We're Gone: Prudent Speculations on America in a Post-
Racial Epoch, 34 ST. Louis U. L.J. 393, 397-400 (1990). Professor Bell's "Chronicle of the
Space Traders," in which white Americans trade the freedom of black Americans for envi-
ronmental protection, is one of the most dramatic statements of the proposition that racism
can play a significant role in environmental protection issues. Id.; Derrick A. Bell Jr., Ra-
cism: A Prophecy for the Year 2000, 42 RuTGE s L. REv. 93, 98 (1989).
5 See Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE
L.J. 1211, 1214 (1991); see also BURTON A. WEISBROD ET AL., PUBLIC INTEREST LAw: AN
ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYsIs 103, 555 (1978).
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There was a notable Wall Street Journal Op-Ed piece recently,
which said, "it's not racism, it's just politics."6 Those two are no
more related or unrelated than yellow is to green. There is, at
bottom, a relationship between the two. Yellow is after all part of
green, and race is part of the economy. Race is part of politics.
The fact that African-Americans and persons of color generally
have less economic power, less choice, are less able to resist the
risks caused by environmental degradation; is that unrelated to
racism? 7 To say that their immediate cause may, in some in-
stances, be market forces is not to say it is unrelated to race.
After all, a fairly fundamental reason why persons of color have
less economic power is related to decades of de jure legalized racist
laws in this country and their continuing vestiges, which cause
African-Americans and other persons of color to have less eco-
nomic power and less political power.' It is no more sensible to say
that the distribution of such power is unrelated to race than to
posit that school segregation patterns are unrelated to race, and
just a matter of economics. Can one fairly posit that the reason
why there are fewer persons of color in the wealthy suburban
schools is merely because they just do not happen to live there,
because it costs more to live there? It is therefore simply the re-
sult of economics. It is not race. I doubt it.
Finally, "racism or economics," the asserted dichotomy presup-
poses that siting is what environmental justice is all about. But it
is not. If you take one thing away from the session this morning, it
should be this: Environmental justice is not just about siting. It is
not a code for "Not In My Backyard." It is symptomatic of a much
broader issue. Environmental justice is about distribution. It is
about distribution in the first instance, and it is about distribution
over time.
Environmental justice takes into account the fact that the envi-
ronmental protection laws that are supposed to redress pollution
6 David Schoenbrod, Rule of Environmental 'Injustice" Is About Politics, Not Racism,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 1994, at A21.
7 See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 812. "Minority interests have traditionally had little
voice in the various points of influence that strike the distributional balances necessary to
get environmental protection laws enacted, regulations promulgated, and enforcement ac-
tions initiated." Id.; see also Kenneth L. Karst, The Costs of Motive-Centered Inquiry, 15
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1163, 1165 (1978). See generally EDWARD 0. LAumANN & FRANz V.
PAPPI, NETWORKS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION-A PERSPECTIVE ON COMMUNITY INFLUENCE SYS-
TEMS 5-9 (1976) (describing theory of "social structural analysis").
8 See Aleinikoff, supra note 2, at 1073-75.
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distribute benefits and they distribute harms. They distribute
benefits in terms of jobs.9 They distribute harms in terms of lost
jobs, but they also distribute benefits in terms of improved envi-
ronmental quality. And they distribute harms in terms by shifting
environmental risks. 10 Environmental laws do not eliminate all
risks. They reduce them and they move them." They change
their location. They change their physical status.
What environmental justice is all about is an explicit accounting
of the distributional factors. Not just focusing on allocation effi-
ciency and allowing distribution to occur by default. But instead,
to think about and focus on distribution and its distinct public pol-
icy implications. What happens to those benefits and burdens in
the first instance? Environmental justice, and why it is so signifi-
cant for those like myself who have been involved in environmen-
tal law over the years, is that environmental justice challenges us
to rethink our settled premises and threshold assumptions. It for-
cibly challenges the assumption that environmental law is about
allocational efficiency and is not at all concerned about distribu-
tional fairness.
For years, environmental law was thought to be just about allo-
cational efficiency.' 2 The task facing environmental policymakers
was to figure out what was the right amount of pollution. What
level of pollution is the right amount? Then, how should society
get there? Whether we should do it through a command and con-
trol approach; or whether we should get there through market in-
centives? There was little overt consideration about the distribu-
tional effects and implications of the different techniques that
society might choose.' 3
9 See Business Gains from CAA Exceeding $50 Billion Projected in Draft EPA Study,
INSIDE EPA, Jan. 17, 1992, at 1, 10.
10 See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 794 (discussing conversion of one form of environmental
hazard to another, and effects on minority neighborhoods). See generally CONSERVATION
FOUNDATION, CONTROLLING CROSS-MEDIA POLLUTANTS 8-9 (1984).
11 See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 794-95 (discussing counterproductiveness of shifting
types and concentrations of pollution).
12 See id. at 787 (discussing focus of most scholars on effects of environmental regulation
on large industries, as opposed to smaller groups of people); William Tucker, PROGRESS AND
PRIVILEGE: AMERICA IN THE AGE OF ENvROlNMENTALISM (1982) (stressing environmental-
ism's favoring big businesses at expense of small businesses).
13 See Ken Sexton, Cause for Immediate Concern: Minorities and the Poor Clearly are
More Exposed, EPA J., Mar/Apr. 1992, at 38, 39 (author is Director of EPA's Office of
Health Research).
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The basic assumption was that it was safe to focus on allocation
efficiency because distribution would take care of itself. At worst,
the resulting distribution would be neutral, and at best it would
be progressive. Everyone assumed, with reason, that since poor
and minority communities suffer more from pollution in the first
instance, that the environmental protection laws would likely be
progressive, rather than regressive, and that distribution was
somebody else's problem.
Distribution was not the problem of a technical agency like the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"). It was a problem for a
social welfare agency. That is the kind of agency that should be
concerned with civil rights issues. That is the agency that should
be concerned with distributional issues, not the EPA.
The focus on allocation efficiency resulted, however, in policy-
makers ignoring several countervailing factors. First of all, how
certain cultural assumptions affect the environmental protection
standards in the first instance. For instance, there are several as-
sumptions that regulators make in establishing environmental
protection standards about the kinds of persons being protected,
including their lifestyles, habits and physical characteristics. The
most classic example here has been the assumptions that EPA has
made about fish consumption in promulgating water quality stan-
dards. There are communities within this country in which more,
rather than less, fish are consumed on a daily basis. EPA made,
however, certain averaging assumptions, ignoring those distinct
communities, about how much fish was consumed. 4 As a result,
EPA promulgated water quality standards that are not protective
of those communities.' 5
Second, EPA took little account of risk aggregation.' 6 What the
environmental laws generally do is reduce pollution. You have a
series of sites, and you can claim that Bullard, Greve, Lazarus,
14 See supra note 12 (regarding lack of concern for small groups of people in environmen-
tal pollution allocation decisions).
15 See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 843. "Two kinds of statutory reforms could address this
problem. One possibility would be to require formal agency consideration of the distribu-
tional impacts associated with a particular decision. Such consideration could be required
where the agency establishes rulemaking agendas, promulgates implementing regulations,
and determines enforcement priorities. It could also be required when the agency allocates
grant monies and technical assistance. The second, more ambitious, reform would be to
establish equitable benchmarks that would provide standards for judging discretionary
agency determinations with significant distributional impacts." Id.
16 See Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of
Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 562, 593 (1992).
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Samp and Taibi are all individual sources of pollution, and today
maybe we are. What the environmental protection laws do is re-
duce the level of pollution at each of these sources. They do not
take it down to zero. They may take air pollution and turn it into
an ash. They may take air pollution and turn it into a sludge.
They may take water pollution and turn it into ash. And with
every possible scenario, one level of pollution is turned into a
lower level of pollution.17
Society as a whole is better off. But what happens to those
residual risks? But what happens to those residual risks is that
they tend to aggregate. The twenty or forty units at each of those
areas of pollution reduction are often taken and moved to a new
place. Society as a whole is better off, but not everybody is better
off. It is not a pareto optimal situation where no one is worse off
and everybody is better off. Society is better off, to be sure, but
there are places that may end up being worse off because they end
up with a disproportionate amount of the aggregated risks.'"
What environmental policymakers also ignored was how priori-
ties affect actual environmental quality; what the legislature de-
fines in the first instance to be an environmental problem.19 To
what extent are the problems of the urban environment consid-
ered a priority rather than the problems in rural areas and in pub-
lic lands? EPA's determination of agency priorities is critical to
distributional concerns.20 EPA has had over a thousand deadlines
imposed on it since the early 1970's. But EPA has complied with
about fifteen percent of those deadlines. Which deadlines does
EPA comply with? No one has systematically considered how the
discretion EPA exercises in deadline compliance affects actual en-
vironmental quality and, more importantly, its distribution.
17 See supra note 10 (regarding shifting forms and locations of environmental hazards).
Is See Manley W. Roberts, Comment, A Remedy for the Victims of Pollution Permit Mar-
kets, 92 YALE L.J. 1022, 1027-28 & n.40 (1983); see also Leonard P. Gianessi & Henry M.
Peskin, The Distribution of the Costs of Federal Water Pollution Control Policy, 56 LAND
ECON. 85, 97 (1980).
19 See Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. ECON. &
ORGAN. 59, 64-65 (1992); Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and
Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REv.
431, 454-59 (1989) (describing how policy preferences of various players fashioned com-
promises necessary to secure passage of Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977).
20 See Craig N. Oren, The Clean Air Act of 1990: A Bridge to the Future, 21 ENvTL. L.
1817 (1991); Craig N. Oren, The Protection of Parklands from Air Pollution: A Look at
Current Policy, 13 HARv. ENvTL. L. REv. 313 (1989); Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Environmental
Policy-It is Time for a New Beginning, 14 COLUM. J. ENvrL. L. 111, 117-18 (1989).
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Finally, and perhaps most significantly, is the distributional di-
mension to enforcement. 2' The environmental statutes are not
self-executing. They offer a certain level of promised environmen-
tal protection, but the extent to which you have actual environ-
mental quality depends upon enforcement. It depends upon com-
pliance, and EPA does not possess anywhere near the level of
resources necessary to ensure actual compliance with the laws.2 2
Ultimately, what policymakers failed adequately to consider
was that leaving matters such as priorities and enforcement to
default-not paying direct attention to their distributional impli-
cations-has led to a disproportionate skewing to the detriment of
persons of color. Because of racist attitudes. Because of the ves-
tiges of years of racism in terms of economic power and political
power. And, because of the absence of any overt consideration in
the first instance by the policymakers about the problems of ag-
gregation.23 The result has been aggregation of environmental
risk in communities of color and low-income communities, and,
making matters worse, relatively less enforcement in those
areas.
2 4
Nor should this be surprising. How does EPA decide to allocate
its enforcement authorities? How does EPA decide which dead-
lines to comply with? EPA inevitably responds to those with lev-
erage and the wherewithal to bring matters to the agency's atten-
tion. Who can make the necessary phone calls? Who can exert
power over EPA? Which committees have oversight authority?
Missing from the public policy debate over these years has been
a voice able to bring attention to the distinct problems faced by the
communities that have aggregated environmental risks.25 You
21 See Farber, supra note 19, at 63, 69, 75.
22 See Clifford S. Russell, Monitoring and Enforcement, in PUBLIC POLICIES FOR ENVIRON-
MENTAL PROTECTION 243, 243-70 (Paul R. Portney ed., 1990).
23 See generally Paul Mohai & Bunyon Bryant, Environmental Racism: Reviewing the
Evidence, in RACE AND THE INCIDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS: A TIME FOR DISCOURSE
13-176 (Bunyon Bryant & Paul Mohai eds., 1992); Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Coyle, Une-
qual Protection-The Racial Divide in Environmental Law, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 21, 1992, at
S1-S12 (asserting existence of disparity, based on race or income, of EPA's allocation of
enforcement resources and leverage). But see E. Donald Elliott, A Cabin on the Mountain:
Reflections on the Distributional Consequences of Environmental Protection Programs, 1
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 5, 7 (1991) (suggesting minorities and poor, since they live in more
potentially hazardous areas, probably benefit disproportionately from environmental pro-
tection measures).
24 See Russell, supra note 22, at 243-70.
25 See Errol Meidinger, The Politics of "Market Mechanisms" in U.S. Air Pollution Regu-
lation: Social Structure and Regulatory Culture, in DISTRmBuTIONAL CONFLICTS IN ENVIRON-
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end up, therefore, with the worst problems in the worst places
with the least enforcement. Little government enforcement and
very little citizen suit backup.26
So what do we do about it? The first thing we do is recognize
that unfair distribution is a legitimate problem, and that race is a
factor. As Dr. Bullard said, "It is not just economics." That has
important symbolic value. We are undoubtedly here today be-
cause of the racial dimension to the environmental justice issue.
Second, you have to recognize the legitimacy of the issue: distri-
butional fairness is a legitimate part of environmental law and
environmental policymaking. Equity has intrinsic value. It is
worthy of expenditure of resources independent of allocation effi-
ciency. Renewed emphasis on distributional fairness is also likely
to promote allocation efficiency because we are going to end up
with more enforcement in those areas where we have the biggest
problems. It is illusory to pretend that distribution is not impor-
tant. It is the driving force behind all the laws, as Dr. Greve
recognizes in his own quite forceful writings in this area.
Distribution is, after all, what gets the laws passed. Distribu-
tion in terms of the competing public interest groups meeting in
the hallways and back rooms of Congress where they seek to influ-
ence how laws like the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act are
drafted. It is completely unrealistic to assume that distribution
has nothing to do with those laws. Distribution has everything to
do with those laws. And explains many of their most peculiar pro-
visions. But what has happened is one important voice has not
been heard in those debates that do occur.
MENTAL RESOURCE POLICY 150-86 (Allan Schnaibert et al. eds., 1986). But see Herbert In-
haber, OfLULUs, NIMBYs, NIMTOOs, 107 PUB. INTEREST 52 (1992).
26 See R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144, 1149 (E.D. Va. 1991) (reflecting an Equal
Protection challenge to the siting of a regional landfill in an area populated primarily by
blacks), aff'd, 977 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1992); Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management
Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673, 677 (S.D. Tex. 1979) (illustrating pitfalls of reliance on Equal
Protection litigation theories), aff'd without op., 782 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1986); Harrisburg
Coalition Against Ruining the Env't v. Volpe, 330 F. Supp. 918, 926 (M.D. Pa. 1971) (rais-
ing environmental justice claim in siting context); see also Lazarus, supra note 1, at 832
("The existing case law, therefore, does not give minority plaintiffs much reason to be opti-
mistic about their likelihood for successfully challenging particular actions or decisions
based on an equal protection theory.").
27 See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 792. Virtually all laws have distributional consequences,
including those laws designed to further a particular conception of the public interest. Id.;
see also BURTON A. WEISBROD ET AL., PUBLIC INmREST LAw: AN ECONOMIC AND INSTITU-
TIONAL ANALYSIS 103, 555 (1978); Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying
Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J. 1211, 1214 (1991).
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Distribution should not, though, be a matter of pork, which is
too often what now occurs in Congress. The environmental laws
are all too often used as a source of pork distribution. Distribu-
tional concerns should be properly focussed on more legitimate
policy matters.2" Most simply put, the environmental protection
laws-both their terms and their implementation-need to be re-
formed to take into account distributional fairness. The first step
is consideration, but the second step is to impose some kind of sub-
stantive fairness norms.29
There are already several proposals to do so. There are some
promising proposals on Capitol Hill, which Congress is consider-
ing, one of which was endorsed by then Senator Gore before he
became Vice President, which should make its passage somewhat
more possible.3° There is a recent presidential Executive Order 3'
to which Dr. Bullard referred. But also necessary is the enforce-
ment of existing laws, including Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,32 which is a very promising, yet little utilized legal basis for
addressing environmental justice concerns.33
Existing laws simply need to be enforced. We do not necessarily
need completely new laws. We need to rethink standard setting.
We need to take into account the fact that certain cultures in this
society, that certain communities, engage in activities like fish
consumption, which subject them to greater exposure to risks. We
need to rethink enforcement priorities. 4
The Department of Justice just brought a suit a few weeks ago,
which I think is a good example of what can be done. The lawsuit
was brought under the Safe Drinking Water Act, against the oper-
28 See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 854. "Environmental protection should be seen as a
legitimate basis for promoting human welfare and opportunity and, in particular, for redis-
tributing environmental amenities (and risks) more fairly among all persons." Id.; see also
MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EART-PmLoOPHY, LAw, AND THE ENVIRONMENT
155-58, 167-70 (1988); Richard J. Lazarus, Debunking 'Environmental Feudalism": Pro-
moting the Individual Through the Collective Pursuit of Environmental Quality, 77 IowA L.
REV. 1739, 1768-74 (1992).
29 See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 853. "Governmental and nongovernmental organizations
that currently dominate the process need to promote minority participation in the dialogue
and, even more fundamentally, they need to educate themselves about minority concerns."
Id. at 850; see also Marcia Coyle et al., Washington Brief--Justice Voices, NAT'L L.J., Dec.
28, 1992, at 9.
30 See S. 2806, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
31 Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (1994).
32 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988).
33 See James H. Colopy, The Road Less Travelled: Pursuing Environmental Justice
Through Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 13 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 125 (1994).
34 See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 817-20.
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ator of a mobile home community where the quality of the drink-
ing water for that minority community was very unhealthy and
inadequate, while an adjacent city was receiving very high quality
water. 5 Environmental enforcement priorities and environmental
justice are being linked up in this case. 36 Historically, no enforce-
ment suit would have been brought. What the environmental jus-
tice movement accomplishes is that it makes it a priority for EPA
and for the Justice Department to make sure that those areas that
are not otherwise likely to get enforcement attention, do get that
attention.
There are many more other similar opportunities for harmoniz-
ing environmental law and civil rights. This is an exciting and
challenging time for those like myself involved in environmental
law. It is also a challenging time for policymakers to face up to the
issues and not to resist them. I am glad that these issues are fi-
nally being debated. After years of being on the backburner, they
are now, largely thanks to people like Dr. Bullard, on the
frontburner. To that end, I would like to thank the organizers of
this conference at St. John's for hosting this symposium on envi-
ronmental justice.
35 United States v. Merritt, No. 94-026 (D. Wyo. filed Feb. 4, 1994).
36 See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 853; cf Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Foreword: The Civil Rights
Chronicles, 99 HARv. L. REv. 4, 6-7 (1985).
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